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by the exercise of due diligence could not have been discovered
previously; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other reason
justifying relief. The evidence which must be produced at the
hearing would have to be more than cumulative. Its nature must
be such that if it had been produced at the trial, the outcome
would have been materially altered. The motion must be made
within a reasonable time but in no event should it exceed a period
of one year from the entry of the final judgment.
The adoption of such an amendment would in no way affect
the finality of the judgment nor suspend its operation. If the motion were sustained, the money paid to the plaintiff in satisfaction
of this judgment would be held in trust for the moving defendant.
The effect of such a rule would be to place before the trial court
matters which, if they had been presented at the original trial,
could possibly have produced a different verdict. The purpose of
such a rule would be to prevent recurrence of the situation which
presented itself in the Harvey case. If this recommendation is enacted, it would become an easy matter in proper cases to get before the trial court where exceptions could be taken. With this
rule, the absolute discretion now vested in the trial court could be
reviewed by the highest court in the Commonwealth and would
provide another liberal and forward moving step in the overall
trial procedure.
J.E.M.

RECORDATION OF DEED OF TRUST AS
INQUIRY NOTICE
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Chavis v. Gibbs'
has been able to delineate its definition of notice in respect to purchasers of property under the requirements of the Virginia Recording Act. 2
1 198 Va. 379, 94 S.E. 2d. 195 (1956).
2

Va. Code §55-96 (1950), which states: "Every such contract in writing,
and every deed conveying any such estate or term, . . ., when the
possession is allowed to remain with the grantor, shall be void as to
all purchasers, for valuable consideration without notice not parties
thereto and lien creditors, until and except from the time it is duly
admitted to record ..... , but the mere possession of real estate shall
not of itself constitute notice to purchasers thereof for value of any
interest or estate therein of the person in possession [Emphasis added] ."

Gibbs, the appellee, purchased, on October 20, 1948, property
which had been purchased by his immediate grantor pursuant to
the foreclosure of a recorded deed of trust' in 1936 but had not
been recorded until August 1, 1948. The appellant, Chavis, purchased the same property on January 14, 1948, recording such
deed on January 19, 1948. This sale was by a party whose sole
interest, if any, was the equity of redemption in the property.
Chavis' deed stated that his title was subject to a recorded deed
of trust. Gibbs instituted this suit to determine the title to the land.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the
trial court 4 in favor of Gibbs, held that:
The recorded deed of trust and the recitals of the
deed to Chavis each furnished to him a reasonable and
natural clue to the facts of the subsequent happenings
thereunder which might have been disclosed upon proper
inquiry. Under the circumstances, as shown by the record
in this case, he was not a purchaser without notice, and
consequently does not take title to the property in question by virtue of the provisions of the Code, §55-96.'
This case illustrates what information gathered from the
records is sufficient to put a duty upon a purchaser to inquire into
the facts ascertained from an examination of the record. That is,
"he must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is
charged with notice of all the facts appearing upon their face, or
the knowledge of which anything there appearing will conduct
hiM.,,6

In Burwell v. Fauber7 the Supreme Court of Appeals held that
a purchaser of land from a grantor claiming title under a will
which directed that the debts of the testator were to be paid out
3 The deed of trust was dated May 7, 1928, and was recorded on September
8, 1928.
4 198 Va. 379, 381, 94 S.E. 2d 195, 196 (1956) which stated: "Where a
person purchases land upon which there is a deed of trust, he is required
to take notice of the deed of trust and to determine what has happened
under the deed of trust. In this case such an inquiry would have disclosed that the property had been sold under the deed of trust although
such deed had not been recorded. I am therefore of the opinion that the
deed from the Trustee takes priority over the deed from Morris to
Chavis."
5Id. at 388.
6 Burwell v. Fauber, 21 Grat. (62 Va.) 446, 463 (1871).
Ibid.

of certain land had constructive notice that this land had been sold
to pay charges upon other property. Such information was sufficient
to put a subsequent purchaser on inquiry to determine if all the
debts of the testator had been discharged.
Constructive notice as defined by the Supreme Court of Appeals in Fisher v. Borden" is that information which is "sufficient
to put a person upon inquiry and will charge him with actual
knowledge of the facts of which a diligent pursuit of that inquiry
would have informed him." The code expressly states that mere
possession is insufficient notice to put a prospective purchaser on
inquiry. The interpretation of the present case holds that a deed
of trust given and recorded to secure two notes payable nine and
eighteen months after date is sufficient information to require
diligent inquiry to ascertain if the notes are in default or if the
statute of limitation on the right to foreclose has run. 9 Chavis had
the actual notice imparted from the terms of his deed as well as
the constructive notice afforded by recordation of the deed of trust.
In Tancy v. Mauck, 10 which has been consistently followed in
Virginia, the court held that a "purchaser or incumbrancer of a
mere equitable title must take the place of the person from whom
he purchases." And in Briscoe v. Ashley,"' the Supreme Court of
Appeals distinguished between the purchaser of a legal interest and
the purchaser of a mere equitable title, stating that a purchaser
must hold legal title or be entitled to call for it in order to claim
the protection of a bona fide purchaser.
It should be noted that the appellant in the instant case purchased, at the most, the equitable title. The legal title had previously been conveyed to the appellee. Chavis' right was thus limited
to that of his vendor who could not redeem the legal title because
the foreclosure sale under the deed of trust extinguished this right.
8 111 Va. 535, 543, 69 S.E. 636, 639 (1910).

9 Va. Code §8-11 (1950). Although not germane to the decision, the court
did discuss this point and reached the conclusion that the statute of
limitations would not have run until March 8, 1949.
10 15 Gratt. (56 Va.) 300 (1859). And see Briscoe v. Ashley, infra; Wasserman v. Mitzger, 105 Va. 744, 54 S.E. 893, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1020. In
the latter case, the vendee of an equity of redemption was charged with
notice that the conveyance to his vendor was not made pursuant to the
terms of the deed of trust which had been foreclosed.
1124 Gratt. (65 Va. 3) 454 (1874).

Chavis did not hold the legal title, nor was he entitled to call for
it; hence, he could not claim the protection of a bona fide purchaser.
The court in the instant case summarily dismissed the contention of Chavis that requiring him to search the title to the
property would thus put an intolerable burden upon the legal profession in their examination of the title to real property by stating
that any competent and prudent title examiner would have found
the deed of trust to the trustee, would have noticed that the debt
secured thereby was long past due, would have seen that there was
no deed of release, and that the enforcement of the trust deed was
not barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, this case is important
not only from the viewpoint of what constitutes record notice, but
also from the viewpoint of establishing a partial standard to which
a title examiner will be held.
J.R.S.

TORT-AIR CARRIERS-COMPENSATION
FOR AIR PRESSURE INJURY
This case is presented because of its unique fact situation. In
Marchant v. American Air Lines, Inc.,' the court was faced with
ruling upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's
verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Such motion alleged
thirty-seven grounds as a basis for the granting thereof, including
excessiveness of verdict, verdict contrary to law and evidence, refusal
to grant instructions, and newly-discovered evidence.
The evidence established that plaintiff while a passenger on
defendant's airplane, suffered a ruptured eardrum and damage to
the inner ear resulting in partial loss of hearing and tinnitus,
occasioned, according to the plaintiff, by pressure differences between his middle ear cavity and that of the cabin in which he was
riding. Allegations were made that defendant was negligent in
permitting these pressure differences to arise and, also, in allowing,
after due notice had been given to one of its stewardesses, the
situation to continue to exist. The stewardess denied having been
informed of the discomfort of the plaintiff without, however, ex1 146 F.Supp. 612 (D.C.D. R.I. 1956).

